Firms reduce leverage following credit rating downgrades. A rating downgrade predicts capital structure behavior better than changes in leverage, profitability, or bankruptcy probability.
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Credit ratings are an increasingly important component of finance theory and practice. The Securities and Exchange Commission, in a report on the role and function of credit rating agencies required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SEC (2003) ), concludes "the importance of credit ratings to investors and other market participants had increased significantly, impacting an issuer's access to and cost of capital, the structure of financial transactions, and the ability of fiduciaries and others to make particular investments". Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2006) argue that credit ratings provide an "economically meaningful role" by facilitating equilibrium in bond investment. Kisgen (2006) finds that firms that are near a rating change issue less debt than other firms to avoid downgrades and achieve upgrades. The Economist (2005) asserts that credit rating agencies "are among the most powerful voices in today's capital markets". Maintaining a particular credit rating level provides benefits to a firm. These benefits include the ability to issue commercial paper, access to investors otherwise restricted from investing in the firm's bonds, lower firm disclosure requirements, reduced investor capital reserve requirements, improved third-party relationships, and access to interest rate swap or Eurobond markets. Since a firm's leverage affects its credit rating, these benefits are relevant for determining a firm's optimal leverage in addition to traditional considerations (e.g., the tax benefits of debt). Moreover, unlike traditional capital structure factors that generally imply firm value is a continuous function of leverage, credit rating levels impart discrete benefits, implying that firm value jumps at certain levels of leverage. The benefits of credit rating levels and the discreteness of ratings imply unique capital structure behavior for a firm.
This paper investigates how changes in credit ratings affect a firm's subsequent capital structure decisions. I find that a firm whose credit rating is downgraded subsequently reduces leverage whereas a firm that is upgraded subsequently increases leverage. This behavior is consistent with targeting a credit rating or targeting a leverage level, since changes in leverage and ratings are correlated. To identify credit rating effects specifically, I conduct tests that include lagged changes in a firm's leverage, profitability and probability of bankruptcy as additional explanatory variables for capital structure decisions. In these tests I find that downgrades remain predictive for subsequent capital structure behavior. Further, I find that a downgrade is a better predictor of capital structure behavior than changes to leverage, profitability or probability of bankruptcy.
With these additional variables an upgrade is no longer significant, suggesting that capital structure behavior is not affected by an upgrade once other changes to the firm are considered. These two results are consistent with firms targeting minimum credit rating levels.
The asymmetric behavior following downgrades and upgrades is optimal for a firm assuming that adjusting leverage is costly and that credit rating levels provide benefits to a firm. To illustrate, consider a firm whose leverage is optimal, given traditional factors and the benefits of higher credit rating levels. Now consider if the firm has an increase to leverage that leads to a rating downgrade, and for simplicity assume the firm's optimal leverage has not changed. Since the firm is no longer at its optimal leverage, the tradeoff theory implies the firm will adjust back to the optimum if the benefits outweigh the adjustment costs. The benefits of moving back to the optimum are an increasing function of the distance between the firm's current higher leverage and its optimal leverage. The rating downgrade however imparts specific costs to the firm that alone may exceed adjustment costs, regardless of the size of the departure from the firm's optimal leverage. The downgrade itself may therefore instigate a subsequent leverage reduction independent of other changes to the firm. On the other hand, consider if the firm is upgraded due 1 Anecdotal evidence indicates that firms target credit ratings. For example, PepsiCo surprised participants in the Stern Stewart Roundtable on Capital Structure (2001) by stating a firm policy of maintaining a single-A credit rating. Several recent papers have also provided evidence of the influence of credit ratings on capital structure (Graham and Harvey (2001) , Faulkender and Petersen (2006) , and Kisgen (2006) ).
to a decrease in leverage with no other changes to the firm. The tradeoff theory again implies that the firm will adjust back to its optimal leverage depending on the benefits relative to adjustment costs. However since the rating upgrade imparts specific benefits to the firm, the upgrade itself makes it less likely that the firm will bear the adjustment costs for moving back to the optimal leverage. An upgrade therefore makes it less likely that the firm subsequently changes its leverage, all else equal.
The results for downgraded firms are both economically significant and statistically robust. Firms that have been downgraded issue over 2.0% less net debt as a percentage of assets relative to equity the subsequent year than control firms, after controlling for several other potential effects.
The effects are present when both book and market measures of leverage are used, and when two years of previous changes in leverage are included as a control. The results hold by rating, by industry, by year, and including firm fixed effects. A downgrade predicts both a lower probability of a subsequent debt issuance as well as a higher probability of a debt reduction. The effects are larger at particular ratings, including ratings at the investment grade to speculative grade distinction and such that commercial paper access is affected, providing additional evidence that the effects are rating specific. This paper also considers three other explanations for the behavior around credit rating changes.
First, distress costs might explain the results since credit ratings measure a firm's probability of bankruptcy. Second, a downgrade might affect debt issuance timing such that issuing debt is less attractive following a downgrade or more attractive prior to the downgrade if the firm anticipates the downgrade. Lastly, firms may be downgraded more frequently during economic downturns when debt issuance might be less attractive in general.
The empirical evidence supports the target credit rating explanation compared to these three alternate explanations. The tests control for changes in a firm's leverage, sales, z-score and profitability to identify credit rating effects specifically. The tests identify significantly larger credit rating effects following downgrades compared with upgrades, consistent with targeting minimum credit ratings and inconsistent with distress effects or timing. The results hold in tests by particular rating, in which I find that firms downgraded to a particular rating issue less debt than firms that have that same rating but were not downgraded. In these tests the control group should have similar distress concerns and similar concerns regarding capital market timing. The results are also strongest around particular ratings, whereas the alternate explanations generally imply results should hold more evenly across all ratings. The empirical tests also control for past leverage changes, which measure any previous market timing. Lastly, the credit rating effects are evident in tests by individual year, with consistently strong results across years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I discuss the theoretical arguments and empirical implications for credit rating concerns in the context of tradeoff theory. In Section II, I conduct empirical tests to identify whether firms target minimum ratings. In section III, I examine the extent to which firms are successful in targeting credit ratings by providing specific cases of firm capital structure activity. In Section IV, I conclude.
I. Tradeoff Theory with Discrete Credit Rating Benefits

A. The Impact of Discrete Credit Rating Benefits on Optimal Leverage
The tradeoff theory states that a value-maximizing firm will balance the benefits of debt against the costs of debt to determine the internal optimal leverage for the firm. Traditional benefits of debt include that interest payments on debt are tax deductible and that the required payments of debt mitigate the potential for managers to misallocate free cash flow. Costs of debt include the present value of the direct and indirect costs of bankruptcy as well as the potential risk shifting or underinvestment incentives that can occur with high leverage.
Higher credit rating levels provide discrete benefits to the firm not traditionally considered as benefits of lower leverage in the tradeoff theory (I henceforth refer to the tradeoff theory without consideration of discrete credit rating benefits as TT). Credit rating levels affect whether investor groups such as banks or pension funds are allowed to invest in a firm's bonds and the capital requirements for investing in a firm's bonds for insurance companies and broker-dealers. Ratings also signal firm quality to investors such that firms are pooled together by rating resulting in discrete differences in a firm's cost of capital from different rating levels.
2 Additionally, bond covenants can require a change in bond coupon rate at different rating levels, some contracts are signed conditional on a minimum rating, and the ability to access the commercial paper, Eurobond, or interest rate swap market requires minimum credit ratings. 3 TT and credit rating effects together imply firms will balance the traditional tradeoff benefits of higher leverage against the traditional benefits of lower leverage and these discrete credit rating benefits of lower leverage (henceforth referred to as "TTCR"). 2 Regulation FD excludes credit rating agencies thereby allowing credit rating agencies to continue to receive nonpublic information from firms. Boot, Milbourn and Schmeits (2005) provide a model whereby credit rating agencies provide a "focal point" for investors, and Millon and Thakor (1985) propose a model for the existence of "information gathering agencies" such as credit rating agencies based on information asymmetries. 3 For example, Enron's takeover of Dynegy was made contingent on Enron maintaining an investment grade rating (International Herald Tribune (2002) ), and EDS was concerned about a lower rating because it "could make signing new customers more difficult" (Wall Street Journal, 2004) . Access to commercial paper is discussed in detail in Section II.D. 4 Firms could instead balance the benefits of higher ratings versus costs of issuing equity implied by the pecking order theory. Also, the psychological impact of a credit rating downgrade (or upgrade) could influence a manager's decision-making (and perhaps asymmetrically). These considerations are not investigated in this paper.
Formally, representing the benefits of debt to the firm as a function of leverage as B(L) and the costs of debt as a function of leverage as C(L), TT argues that a financial manager maximizes firm
5 TTCR implies that for any particular firm at certain levels of leverage, L r (r∈{AAA,AA+,…,CCC-, D}), the firm incurs a discrete benefit, Φ r , if leverage is less than or equal to L r . 6 Let Φ(L) equal the cumulative rating benefits implied by leverage L (equal to Σ Φ r ∀ r such that L r ≥ L). Firms will then maximize
, and for some firms, the optimal leverage will be L r* < L T . The objective functions are:
To illustrate, consider the simple example where
and all other Φ=0. In this case, the TT optimal leverage is equal to 50%, implying a speculative grade credit rating (since 50% > 45%). The optimal leverage under TTCR is instead at 45%, the leverage required to obtain a BBB-rating, since V(50%)=0.25 and V(45%)=0.2675. Generally,
. TTCR implies a lower optimal leverage than TT if the discrete credit rating benefit outweighs the lost traditional tradeoff theory benefits from departing from the TT optimum.
B. Testing Implications of TTCR
To test TTCR I examine changes to a firm's leverage and/or credit rating, and consider how the implications for subsequent capital structure decisions are different for TTCR versus TT. The implications are tested with the following regressions:
NetDIss is a measure of the firm's leverage changing capital market decision at time t, equal to a firm's net debt issuance minus net equity issuance divided by assets (specifically, net debt issuance is long-term debt issuance (Compustat data item no. 111) minus long-term debt reduction (no. 114) plus changes in current debt (no. 301), and net equity issuance is sale of common and preferred stock (no. 108) minus purchase of common and preferred stock (no. 115)). This measure identifies direct capital market activity decisions of managers (Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) , Leary and Roberts (2005) and Kisgen (2006) use a similar measure). Downgrade and Upgrade are dummy variables equal to 1 if the firm was downgraded or upgraded the previous year, respectively.
Lagged changes in ratings are used to reduce potential endogeneity. ΔLeverage is equal to the lagged year over year change in leverage; for example, if the firm increased leverage from 50% at time t-2 to 55% at t-1, this variable takes a value of 5%. K includes variables that measure a firm's change in financial condition, such as changes in profitability or z-score (these variables are discussed in further detail in Section II.B).
Tests of incremental capital structure decisions of this nature implicitly assume that firms at certain points in time are not at optimal leverage levels, and therefore specific subsequent capital market activity is implied (see Graham (1996) and Mackie-Mason (1990) for similar approaches). I assume that firms are at their optimal leverage and credit rating prior to the change in leverage or rating identified in equations (2) and (3) and test the implications for NetDIss given movements away from the optimum.
7 If a firm has moved away from its optimal leverage, a manager will undertake capital structure behavior to change leverage to the firm's optimum if the benefits outweigh the adjustment costs, AC, incurred. Adjustment costs can be a significant influence on capital structure variation and policy, implying that in certain cases a firm will depart from its optimal leverage over periods of time (Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) , Leary and Roberts (2005) , Flannery and Rangan (2005)).
The empirical specification of equations (2) and (3) examines firm behavior in the year following a change in rating relative to other firm years. This specification could yield spurious results if some unobserved firm factor leads a firm to, for example, regularly reduce debt and also receive downgrades. To address this, I also include fixed effects in some tests to examine firm behavior following a downgrade relative to its own behavior in other years. These fixed effects tests identify activity specific to the firm itself. The empirical specification also examines behavior only in the first year following the change in rating relative to other firm years. While a downgrade may affect behavior beyond this year, the year after the downgrade is most likely to be 7 Since some changes in leverage and ratings may instead represent movements toward the optimum, thereby implying no specific capital market activity, coefficients identifying leverage and credit rating effects in (2) and (3) are biased toward zero. At a particular point in time, t-2, a firm might be at its target leverage (target rating) or away from its target. A change in leverage (rating) at time t-1 may indicate a move back toward the firm's target or away from the target. A change back to the target implies no particular capital structure activity at time t. Since the firm moved back toward their target, the firm should be equally likely to issue debt or equity the subsequent period (assuming the firm does not move partially back to the target).
affected by the rating change. Furthermore, behavior in subsequent years may be affected by subsequent changes in ratings and other changes to the firm.
In this context, TTCR has distinct implications compared to TT. TTCR implies firms that are downgraded are more likely to reduce leverage the subsequent period compared to nondowngraded firms, even when controlling for changes in leverage and firm characteristics that measure distress. TTCR also implies that, after controlling for changes in leverage and other firm characteristics, an upgrade will not significantly affect subsequent capital structure behavior. An upgrade itself is beneficial to a firm, so a firm will not seek to reverse it. TTCR further implies that downgrades at ratings levels where discrete rating costs are larger will increase the likelihood for leverage reducing capital market decisions.
To illustrate these implications of TTCR, I continue with the simple example from
, L BBB-= 45% and Φ BBB-= .02. I further assume that L BBB = 40%, Φ BBB = .005 and AC=.01 (and all other Φ=0). In this case, the firm's optimal leverage is still 45% under TTCR, and the optimal rating is BBB-. Consider in this example a firm that receives exogenous shocks to leverage with no change to the fundamentals of the firm (perhaps from exogenous changes in cash flow) such that leverage changes each year in the following pattern: 45% to 43% to 45% to 47%.
Optimal leverage remains at 45% throughout since the fundamentals of the firm are unchanged.
However, in the first year when leverage changes from 45% to 43%, no capital structure activity is implied since the benefits of changing leverage to 45% are not larger than the adjustment costs (V(45%)-V(43%)<.01). The subsequent change in leverage from 43% to 45% also does not imply capital structure behavior. The change from 45% to 47% causes a downgrade and implies the firm will undertake leverage-reducing capital structure behavior, since V(45%)-V(47%)>.01, specifically because of the discrete cost of the downgrade. If the firm achieves an upgrade in a subsequent year by changing leverage back to 45%, no capital structure activity is implied following the upgrade and change in leverage.
Now consider a firm that incurs exogenous shocks such that leverage changes each year from 45% to 41% to 38% to 36%. The change in leverage from 45% to 41% is not large enough to justify capital market activity to move back to 45%, since V(45%)-V(41%)<.01. The change in leverage to 38% results in an upgrade and, due to the upgrade, adjustment costs are still larger than the benefits of moving back to the optimal leverage of 45%, so no capital market activity is implied.
After the change in leverage to 36%, leverage-increasing capital market activity is implied, due to TT considerations, and the firm will move back to its optimal leverage of 45%. Following this change in leverage to 45%, the firm is downgraded but no capital market activity is implied.
This illustration includes two instances of upgrades and two instances of downgrades. Following three out of four of these changes in rating, no capital structure activity is implied. Following one of the two downgrades, leverage-reducing capital market activity is uniquely implied by TTCR given the discrete costs of a downgrade. The larger the cost of a downgrade, the more likely that TTCR implies subsequent leverage reducing activity following the downgrade.
This illustration is one of three cases in which a firm can have a change in rating, each more formally modeled in the Appendix. The second case is if a rating agency changes its rating standards. Rating agencies may become more or less stringent (for example, Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) find that rating agencies consistently became more stringent from 1978-1995).
In the previous numerical example, this implies the level of L BBB-changes. If for example L BBBchanged to 43%, the firm would be downgraded if its leverage were 45%, and TTCR implies that the firm would subsequently reduce leverage to 43% to regain the BBB-rating. This implication is distinct from TT and consistent with the TTCR implication of the first case. The discrete cost of the downgrade implies leverage reducing capital market activity following a downgrade. Unlike the first case however, in certain instances more stringent rating standards may imply the firm should actually increase debt under TTCR. This could occur if the rating agency has become so stringent that the required leverage to maintain the previous target rating is no longer optimal.
This implication is again distinct to TTCR, and the empirical tests implicitly test which effect is more prominent. The third case in which a firm may be downgraded is when the firm changes fundamentally, such as from a permanent change to expected cash flows. This instance is more complex, since this implies changes in the functional form of C(L) or B(L) as well as changes to the levels of L r . TT and TTCR can therefore have similar implications; however, the implications unique to the discrete cost of the downgrade are similar to the first instance. The empirical tests identify the TTCR specific effects by controlling for fundamental changes in the firm, including changes to profitability and probability of bankruptcy. The implications following an upgrade in these two additional cases follow similarly to the first case, such that an upgrade by itself does not imply subsequent capital structure activity.
II. Empirical Tests
A. Data and Summary Statistics
The sample is constructed from all firms with a credit rating in Compustat. Approximately 78% of outstanding debt is issued by firms with a public debt rating (Faulkender and Petersen (2006) ), suggesting this sample covers a significant portion of firms active in capital markets. The credit rating used is Standard & Poor's Long-Term Domestic Issuer Credit Rating (Compustat data item no. 280). This rating is the firm's "corporate credit rating", which is a "current opinion on an issuer's overall capacity to pay its financial obligations" (Standard and Poor's (2001)). Compustat also includes subordinated ratings and commercial paper ratings for firms. Subordinated ratings have a strict correspondence to long-term ratings, so little additional information is gained from these ratings for tests of this paper. Commercial paper ratings are examined separately in individual tests.
The sample period for the tests is 1987 to 2003 (1985 is the first year credit ratings are available in
Compustat and at least 2 years of lagged data is required for all tests). I exclude firm years in which the firm has missing data in the fields required regularly for the tests in the paper. Table I indicates the downgrade and upgrade activity at each rating. With few exceptions, each rating category has significant firm years in which firms are both upgraded and downgraded to the particular rating.
922 downgrades are to ratings that are investment grade, and 805 downgrades are to ratings that are speculative grade. 677 upgrades are to ratings that are investment grade and 467 upgrades are to ratings that are speculative grade. Table II shows the percentage of firm years that have debt and equity issuance and reduction activity, with firm years separated by the previous year's change in rating. An issuance or reduction is defined as a net amount greater than 5% of beginning of period assets, as in 8 These are Compustat data item no 's, 6, 12, 13, 25, 35, 108, 111, 114, 115, and 199. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) . The table indicates that downgraded firms are more likely to reduce debt or issue equity and are less likely to issue debt or reduce equity than other firms.
For example, downgraded firms are 86% more likely to reduce debt than non-downgraded firms.
Furthermore, firms that are downgraded to a speculative grade rating from an investment grade rating are more likely to reduce debt or issue equity and less likely to issue debt or reduce equity than other downgraded firms. For example, firms downgraded to speculative are 50% more likely to reduce debt than other downgraded firms, and are nearly three times more likely to reduce debt than other firms in general.
The capital market activity following upgrades is less consistent. For example, upgraded firms are more likely to issue debt, however firms that are upgraded to investment grade are less likely to issue debt than other upgraded firms. Upgraded firms are also more likely to issue equity and more likely to reduce equity. To some extent however, the pattern for upgraded firms indicates that upgraded firms are more likely to conduct leverage increasing capital market activity. (2) and (3).
B. Empirical Results
Results of regressions of equations (2) and (3) are shown in Table III . Separate tests of equations (2) and (3) are conducted using changes in book and market levels of leverage, 9 with assets in NetDIss defined corresponding to the measure used for the change in leverage explanatory variable. Leverage is defined as in Fama and French (2002) as: (liabilities plus preferred stock minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit)/(book assets or market value of the firm).
Control variables include lagged levels of a cardinalized value of the firm's credit rating level (AAA=1, AA+=2, AA=3, etc.), sales, profitability, market-to-book ratio and changes in a firm's size, profitability, market-to-book ratio and z-score. 10 Levels of a firm's credit rating, size, profitability and market-to-book ratio control for the possibility that upgraded and downgraded firms are systematically different (e.g., upgraded firms might generally be higher quality or have higher growth potential). Changes in a firm's size, profitability and z-score (in addition to changes in leverage) control for changes in financial distress and other characteristics (Graham (1996) ) to identify distinct credit rating effects. Changes in the market-to-book ratio controls for potential market timing (Baker and Wurgler (2002) ).
Equation (2) does not include control variables, and the results of this test shown in column 1 and 2 of Table III indicate a large impact of changes in rating on leverage decisions. For the book measure, a firm that has been downgraded issues over 4.0% less net debt relative to net equity than other firms, and a firm that has been upgraded issues approximately 1.0% more debt relative to equity than other firms. The results are significant at 1% and 5%, respectively. The significant downgrade and upgrade results without control variables are consistent with both credit rating effects and distress or target leverage effects. However, the null that β 1 = -β 2 is rejected at 1% for the tests in columns 1 and 2 in favor of β 1 > -β 2 , consistent with TTCR and inconsistent with ratings only proxying for distress concerns.
Columns 3 and 4 show results using the full set of changes and levels of firm characteristics as control variables. In these regressions, the coefficient on Downgrade remains economically and statistically significant. Firms that have been downgraded issue over 2.0% less net debt relative to equity in both cases, and the coefficient is statistically significant at 1% in both cases. Consistent with TTCR, downgraded firms undertake capital structure behavior to attempt to regain their previous rating after controlling for changes in leverage and other firm characteristics. After controlling for these changes in the firm, the upgrade coefficient is no longer statistically significantly different from zero for the book measures of leverage, and is only significant at 10%
for the market measures of leverage. This result is also consistent with TTCR. Firms do not attempt to reverse an upgrade, after controlling for changes in leverage and the firm's financial condition, because the upgrade, when considered by itself, brings discrete benefits to the firm.
Conditional on other changes to the firm, a manager does not have an incentive to reverse an upgrade, and this is confirmed by these results. This lack of symmetry is inconsistent with the alternate explanation that firms react to changes in credit ratings because they proxy for changes in financial distress costs. If firms are reacting to changes in distress costs as represented by changes in ratings, firms that are upgraded should issue more debt relative to equity than other firms, as they have lower distress costs. The null that the coefficient on the upgrade dummy variable is equal to negative the coefficient on the downgrade dummy variable is again rejected at 1%.
I examine the predictive capability of the downgrade variable relative to changes in leverage, profitability and z-score. In separate regressions of NetDIss on each of the four individual variables, the coefficient on the explanatory variable has the sign predicted by theory and is significant at 1% (tables not reported). Regressions with only the downgrade variable however have the highest R-squared, twice that of the next best regression. Regressions with the downgrade variable also have the lowest root mean squared error. Lastly, in regressions with all four explanatory variables, only the downgrade variable remains statistically significant at 1%.
The downgrade variable is a better predictor of capital structure behavior than changes to leverage, profitability or z-score.
I also conduct logit regressions in which the dependent variables are binary measures indicating debt issuance versus no issuance and debt reduction versus no debt reduction to determine the relative predictability of the explanatory variables (tables not reported). An issuance and reduction is defined as greater than 5% of total assets. In these tests, a downgrade predicts both a lower probability of debt issuance as well as a higher probability of debt reduction. Further, the downgrade variable is again a greater predictor of capital structure choice than any of the other three variables, using measures of observed fit or log-likelihood statistics.
Interpreting the behavior following a downgrade may be confounded by potential endogeneity of the downgrade. In particular, firms may time capital structure behavior in anticipation of a change in rating, or make other changes to the firm that precipitate a downgrade and leverage reduction.
Measuring the rating change the year prior to the capital structure decision however reduces the potential for endogeneity. Further, including lagged changes in leverage captures capital structure timing prior to the change in rating. Also, logit regressions indicate that a downgrade predicts both a lower probability of debt issuance as well as a higher probability of debt reduction. While firms may be reluctant to issue debt following a downgrade because of a higher cost of debt, a higher cost of debt does not imply that a firm would be more likely to reduce debt (since the rate for existing debt is already determined). Any alternate story must explain why downgrades lead to both a higher probability of a debt reduction and a lower probability of a debt issuance, controlling for previous changes in leverage. The empirical evidence is most consistent with firms reducing leverage to regain a minimum target rating level.
These results are related to the results of Kisgen (2006), as both papers examine firm capital structure behavior given benefits of credit rating levels. Kisgen finds that firms near a rating downgrade or upgrade issue less debt relative to equity than other firms. This paper differs from Kisgen in two important ways. First, this paper examines implied behavior following changes in credit ratings, whereas Kisgen tests behavior before a change in rating. Second, Kisgen excludes large offerings of debt or equity in the empirical tests, since large offerings may lead to a rating change whether the firm is near a change in rating or not. The tests of this paper on the other hand apply to all offerings, and thus have broader implications for firm leverage, specifically implying lower levels of leverage for firms. Further, the downgrade variable is easily integrated into other tests of capital structure behavior, since no sample restriction is made and the variable is straightforward to construct. The results of both papers however are complementary, since it is consistent for firms to try to avoid downgrades and achieve upgrades while also trying to reverse downgrades (but not reverse upgrades).
To evaluate the robustness of the coefficients and standard errors, I report results from two additional tests. 11 First, I calculate standard errors clustered by firm as suggested by Rogers (1993) and Arellano (1987 exclude firm level control variables since the firm effect together with changes in those variables fully subsumes these firm level effects (I also exclude firm years with only one year of data as these will add no additional information in this framework). The results from these tests, shown in columns 5-8, indicate the results are robust to these alternate econometric designs. The credit rating results remain strong after including dummy variables for each firm, and the standard errors are largely unchanged when a clustering approach is used. The robustness of the results to the inclusion of fixed firm effects indicates that the behavior following downgrades is not due only to variation across firms. The results are also robust to tests with random effects, inclusion of year and industry dummy variables, exclusion of SIC codes 4000-4999 and 6000-6999, and with tstatistics calculated using the approach suggested by Fama and MacBeth (1973) (tables not reported). I conclude from these statistical robustness tests that the OLS results are not compromised by the panel data specification, and I therefore report OLS coefficients and White's standard errors for the remainder of the paper.
The results shown in Table III indicate that firms are also targeting leverage levels to some extent.
Firms with leverage increases (decreases) issue less (more) net debt relative to net equity the subsequent year. The sizes of the coefficients are small however. The coefficient in Column 3 on
ΔLeverage indicates that a firm whose leverage increased by 10% the previous year will issue 0.3% less debt relative to equity as a percentage of assets the subsequent year (compared to the 2.0% coefficient on the Downgrade variable). These tests likely underestimate target leverage behavior as discussed in Section I. Even with consideration for the conservative nature of this test however, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the change in leverage variables are significantly smaller than those on the Downgrade variable, indicating a firm's change in rating is a greater influence on capital structure decisions than a firm's change in leverage.
The somewhat weak target leverage results so far might be consistent with firms adjusting toward target leverages over periods longer than one year, as argued in Leary and Roberts (2004) and Flannery and Rangan (2004) . While this argument could equally be applied for credit rating concerns (if adjustment costs are high, firms might not immediately try to move back to their target rating), I conduct an additional test including changes in leverage from the two previous years, but still only including the credit rating change from the previous year. Table IV shows results that support the idea that firms undertake capital structure behavior to move back to target leverages for periods longer than one year. Changes in leverage two years prior are predictive for capital market activity today, with and without control variables. The sum of the coefficients without control variables indicates that firms reverse over 12% of a leverage change within the 2 years following the change in leverage. Again, the conservative nature of these tests suggests this figure is a lower bound. The implications for credit ratings are unchanged in these regressions.
Firms that are downgraded continue to issue less debt than other firms, even with these extensive control variables, and the magnitude of the effect is largely unchanged. The upgrade dummy variable is no longer statistically significant in any test suggesting that this full set of controls account for the extent to which credit ratings proxy for distress costs. The significance of the downgrade variable with these control variables indicates that firms are concerned with maintaining minimum rating levels.
The coefficients on the additional explanatory variables shown in Table IV 12 For example, consider three firms with net debt minus net equity issuance of 40, 60 and 80 million, all with book assets of $1 billion. Assume these three firms have market to book ratios of 1, 2 and 4, respectively, and for simplicity assume that they are 100% equity financed at the beginning of the period. These firms have a positive relationship of book NetDIss to market-to-book and a negative relationship of market NetDIss to market-to-book.
D. Results by Rating
In this section I examine the impact of downgrades at particular rating levels on subsequent leverage decisions. TTCR implies greater capital structure effects at ratings levels in which the cost of a lower rating is larger. Testing effects by rating provides an additional test of TTCR distinct from alternate explanations for the credit rating results, since several alternate explanations imply uniform reactions to changes in credit rating. I test individual rating effects in two ways. I conduct tests at each rating level comparing firms downgraded to each rating to a control group of firms with the same rating that were not downgraded. Since the control group has the same rating as the downgraded firm, they should have similar financial distress concerns and costs of debt.
The second way I test the effects of particular ratings is to incorporate dummy variables for a specific change in rating directly into the regressions of equation (3). In these tests, I examine the incremental effect of specific rating levels that have higher costs associated with them, including the investment grade to speculative grade change, the change from B to CCC, and changes that directly affect commercial paper access. These tests by rating might still reflect some distress effects if firms that are downgraded are downgraded again the next year and consequently have greater distress concerns than their control groups. To account for this, I also conduct the tests by rating with control firms based on the firm's rating at time t, at the end of the year when capital structure activity is taking place. The capital structure activity of firms that are downgraded is thereby compared against firms that have the same rating at the end of that year. The downgrade dummy variable is still lagged such that the regressions remain predictive. Results using this approach are very similar to those in Panel A of Table V , with limited exceptions (tables not reported).
D.1. Individual Rating Tests
The ratings levels that are most significant largely correspond to ratings in which discrete benefits of those ratings levels are largest. Firms target ratings around the change from investment grade to speculative grade (BBB-to BB+). A speculative grade rating prohibits some investor groups from investing in a firm's bonds (e.g., banks and pension funds) and increases capital charges for other investors. Ratings triggers are also most prevalent around the change in rating from investment grade to speculative grade, and disclosure requirements increase at this change in rating.
The changes at higher ratings levels correspond to ratings that are significant for commercial paper, asset-backed securities, and interest rate swap market access. The size of the commercial paper market was $1.4 trillion as of 2004, and industrial firms as well as financial firms find commercial paper to be a valuable source of short-term capital. Standard and Poor's (2001) notes a "strong link" between a firm's long-term rating and its commercial paper rating: an A long-term rating (or higher) is generally necessary to obtain an A1 commercial paper rating, a minimum BBB rating is required to receive an A2 rating, firms with a BBB rating with a negative outlook or a BBB-rating are rated A3, and a firm with a junk bond rating would receive a commercial paper rating of B or below. Previous literature further indicates the importance of the commercial paper market and the impact of commercial paper rating changes on stock prices and commercial paper outstanding (Hahn (1993), Crabbe and Post (1994), Nayar and Nozef (1994)). Several regulations are also tied to these higher ratings: money market funds must limit holdings of short-term bonds to short-term ratings that correspond to an A long-term rating or better, lending is permitted against mortgage-backed securities and foreign bonds rated AA or better, and pension funds are allowed to invest in asset-backed securities rated A or better (Cantor and Packer (1997) ).
California state regulations also prohibit California-incorporated insurance companies from investing in bonds rated below single-A (SEC (2003)).
Results are also strong around the B to CCC distinction. A minimum B rating has regulatory advantages and can be significant for third party relationships (for example, a condition for GE to provide financing for a large jet order by US Airways was that US Airways credit rating not fall below B-(Financial Times (2004))). Liquidity is also a significant concern around these ratings (Patel, Evans and Burnett (1998) ). This result is also consistent with anecdotal evidence of clustering at B rating levels (Financial Times (2005) ) and large increases in spreads from a change in rating from B-to CCC+.
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A downgrade can be to a rating more than one category lower (e.g., from BBB+ to BBB-instead of BBB+ to BBB). The significant results at the BB rating, for example, may therefore be due to firms downgraded from an investment grade rating trying to regain that rating. Johnson (2003) finds that firms receiving a downgrade from BBB-will "travel" more categories than other ratings levels, implying firms that are downgraded from this rating can often be downgraded to BB or lower. I conduct additional tests that separate the downgrade dummy variable into two dummy variables, one that indicates the firm was downgraded one category (e.g., BBB+ to BBB) and one that indicates the firm was downgraded more than one category (e.g., BBB+ to BBB-). Panel B of Table V shows results of these tests at credit rating levels that were consistently significant in the Panel A tests. The results for firms downgraded to investment grade ratings (AA-, A, BBB and BBB-) do not indicate a stronger effect for a multiple rating change relative to a single rating change. These results suggest that firms target ratings levels one category above the rating to which they were downgraded. The BBB results indicate a desire to move back to the previous rating whether it was one category above (BBB+) or two or more above (A-or higher). The effect of being downgraded to BB however is significantly stronger for firms moving two or more categories down to BB; that is, they went from investment grade (BBB-or above) to speculative 13 The size of the coefficients in the CCC category suggests that the overall results in Table III may be driven by CCC firms alone. Excluding CCC firms however from the regressions of equations (2) and (3) does not materially affect the results of Table III . The CCC rating levels have a small number of firm years, as shown in Table I , and thus do not significantly impact the overall results. The incremental effect of the B/CCC distinction is directly tested in the following section.
grade. This result underscores the significance of maintaining an investment grade rating for firms. This result and the significance of the downgrade to BB+ in Panel A and B indicate that certain firms target a minimum investment grade rating. For all of the CCC results, the results are strongest for firms experiencing a multiple rating change, suggesting that certain firms also target a minimum rating of B-. Table VI shows tests of equation (3) with the inclusion of additional dummy variables that identify downgrades at specific rating levels (investment grade to speculative and B to CCC) and downgrades of commercial paper ratings (A1 to A2 and A2 to A3). The coefficients on these dummy variables are incremental to the overall downgrade effect since the general downgrade variable includes the specific rating downgrades and over 90% of firms that have their commercial paper rating downgraded also receive long-term rating downgrades.
D.2. Incremental Impact of Certain Rating Levels
Results shown in Table VI indicate that firms whose credit rating is downgraded to speculative from investment grade issue incrementally less debt relative to equity than other downgraded firms. For the continuous dependent variable NetDIss (columns 1 and 2), a downgrade to speculative implies approximately 1% less debt issuance relative to equity as a percentage of assets compared to other downgraded firms, although the coefficient is only significant at 10% for one of the two specifications. In logit tests with binary dependent variables indicating debt issuance (column 5) or debt reductions (column 7), firms that are downgraded to speculative are incrementally less likely to issue debt and more likely to reduce debt, and the result for reducing debt is significant at 1%. Average marginal probabilities computed from the test of column 7
indicate that a downgrade increases the probability of a debt reduction in a given year by 5.4%, and a downgrade to speculative increases the probability an additional 4.6%. For any given year, a firm has a probability of reducing debt of approximately 14.6%, so these increases are economically meaningful. An odds ratio derived from the test of column 5 implies that a downgrade, after controlling for other factors, decreases the likelihood of a debt issuance by 34%. CCC however implies that both an issuance of debt and reduction of debt are less likely. Taken together these results imply that firms that are downgraded to CCC reduce leverage, however the firms are unable to retire debt directly and instead must reduce debt through equity issuance or reduced issuance of debt.
Table VI also indicates a strong incremental impact of a change in commercial paper rating from A2 to A3. The two main tiers of ratings in the commercial paper market are A1 and A2, and
Crabbe and Post (1994) note that 97% of commercial paper carried this rating in 1991. A downgrade therefore to A3 significantly restricts a firm's access to the commercial paper market.
This result corresponds to the results of Table V that indicate effects at the BBB and BBB-longterm ratings, since these ratings levels correspond to changes in commercial paper rating from A2 to A3. The change from A1 to A2 is not incrementally significant, and in some cases is significant in the opposite direction predicted (although when considered with the downgrade variable, the coefficients together imply no significant capital structure activity for this change in rating).
Money market funds, who make up a significant portion of commercial paper investment, invest nearly exclusively in A1 rated paper, and A1 rated commercial paper has more favorable firm liquidity requirements than lower rated paper and lower spreads (Hahn (1993) ). Despite this, the A1 to A2 change does not lead to leverage reductions. These results are consistent with Nayar and Rozeff (1994), who find significant negative stock price reactions to downgrades in commercial paper ratings for firms. They also find that a downgrade to A3 has a greater negative stock price reaction than a downgrade to A2, and that stock prices react positively to a firm receiving an initial commercial paper rating.
E. Results by Year
The results indicating that firms target a minimum credit rating could be driven by changes in the business cycle, if more firms are downgraded during economic downturns and firms issue less debt during these same periods. Table VII shows results of equation (3) for market value measures by year. The table indicates the downgrade results are significant across individual years. The coefficient on downgrade is significant at 5% in 11 out of 17 years, and the coefficient is negative in every year. The magnitudes across years are also significant, with downgraded firms issuing over 1.5% more net equity than net debt in 14 out of 17 years. These results confirm that the results of this paper are independent of business cycles.
The incentives to regain a target rating might still be strongest in years in which credit spreads are largest. To examine this relationship, I calculate the average spread between BBB and AAA bonds for the three months prior to each year (I also calculate the average for 12 months prior to the issuance year, with little change in results). The simple correlation between this spread and the coefficients reported in Table VII is -0.59. The coefficient on an interaction term between the spread and downgrade variable is also negative and statistically significant when included in equation (3) of the paper (tables not reported). These results suggest target credit rating behavior is largest when credit spreads are higher.
III. Do Firms Succeed in Targeting a Rating?
Not all firms have the ability to achieve a desired rating, given a firm's financial condition or limitations on access to capital. Many downgraded firms however are successful at achieving subsequent upgrades. I examine firms that have at least one downgrade during the sample period and that have 5 years of data following one of the downgrades. This criterion identifies 266 firms in the sample. Of these firms, 149 (56.0%) received an upgrade in their rating within the 5 subsequent years following the downgrade. Over half of downgraded firms are able to achieve upgrades within a reasonable period following the downgrade.
Additionally, firms that actively target a minimum credit rating are more likely to achieve upgrades following a downgrade. 6.3% of downgraded firms are upgraded the subsequent year if
NetDIss is negative that year, whereas 3.6% of downgraded firms are upgraded the subsequent year if NetDIss is positive. This data indicates that the dependent variable measures behavior that leads to regaining a target rating. Table VIII shows examples of rating downgrades and leverage changes for 15 different firms in the sample of this study. These situations are illustrative only, however examining the credit rating and leverage changes of actual firms is useful to see if real examples are consistent with the general results of the paper. These firms were identified by screening on firms that were downgraded and that had negative values of net debt minus net equity issuances the subsequent year (that is, they appear to be targeting a minimum credit rating). From that group of firms, specific cases were selected with the additional criterion that the firms were successful in obtaining a subsequent upgrade. 14 These examples illustrate that the empirical tests of this paper identify firms undertaking activity consistent with targeting a minimum credit rating. For example, Panenergy Corp. was downgraded from BBB-to BB+ in 1992, NetDIss was -14.0% in 1993, and they were subsequently upgraded to BBB-in 1993. The empirical results of the paper taken together with these illustrations indicate that firms make long-term leverage level decisions with consideration for minimum credit rating levels.
IV. Conclusions
A firm's capital structure decision is affected more by whether the firm's credit rating was downgraded the previous year than by whether the firm's leverage changed the previous year or previous two years. Firms are more likely to reduce debt and less likely to issue debt following a downgrade. The empirical evidence suggests this behavior is independent of distress concerns, timing activity and yearly business cycle effects and is consistent with a long-term capital structure policy of targeting a minimum credit rating.
Firms target minimum credit ratings at which regulations affect investment in a firm's bonds and at which commercial paper access is affected. Firms target the investment grade rating level, a minimum B-rating, and a minimum A2 commercial paper rating. Regulations based on ratings determine whether certain investor groups (e.g., banks and pension funds) can invest in the bonds, the capital charges that investors (e.g., insurance companies and broker-dealers) incur from holding the bonds, and listing and disclosure requirements for the bonds. Several of these regulations relate particularly to the investment grade distinction and the B-/CCC+ distinction.
Certain higher long-term bond ratings also correspond to commercial paper ratings that directly affect a firm's ability to issue commercial paper.
The effect of discrete credit rating level benefits on capital structure behavior is complementary to the tradeoff theory of capital structure. A downgrade is predictive for issuance behavior after controlling for other tradeoff theory factors, and firms exhibit capital structure behavior consistent with traditional tradeoff theory arguments after controlling for downgrades. Firms whose leverage has increased (decreased) the previous year or the year before are more likely to undertake leverage reducing (increasing) capital market activity the following year, and several other tradeoff theory factors also remain predictive for issuance behavior.
Appendix
A firm can depart from its optimal leverage for the reasons described in the following three cases.
In each case, the subsequent capital structure implications are described for TT and TTCR given the objective functions in equation (1).
Case 1: The firm departs from its optimal leverage to a different level of leverage, L S , but all other firm characteristics are unchanged. This move could occur because the firm did an offering of debt alone or equity alone. Previous literature finds firms will depart from their target leverage for periods of time and then revert to it (Marsh (1982) ), and that firms in a particular year issue debt only or equity only more often than they issue both (Kisgen (2006) and Faulkender and
Petersen (2006)). The firm could also have had an exogenous cash flow shock with no change to future expected cash flows. In this case, the firm's optimal level of leverage remains at L T or L r* under TT or TTCR, respectively.
TT implication: Firms will undertake capital structure behavior to move back to the target if
Since the TT optimal leverage is not measurable, empirical literature has adopted several approaches to measure departure from the target leverage. 15 One way to test this implication not previously explored is to examine firms over time and test if increases (decreases) in leverage are followed by capital structure behavior to reduce (increase)
leverage the following year. Testing the implication in this manner will bias results toward zero as some changes in leverage are not departures from L T , however this implication provides for an intuitive comparison of TT and TTCR and mitigates certain issues with previous tests.
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TTCR implication: Firms will undertake capital structure behavior to move back to the target if implications that are different from TT however. Conditional on the same change in leverage, this inequality implies a credit rating downgrade increases the probability that a firm will reduce leverage the subsequent year. Similarly, for even a small change in leverage, a firm that receives a downgrade might still reduce leverage to regain the higher rating if the benefits of that higher 15 One approach to estimating the target is to take the average leverage over the sample period or historically (Taggert (1977) , Marsh (1982) , Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ). An alternate approach is to regress leverage crosssectionally on factors thought to predict leverage and use predicted values from these regressions as target leverages (Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Fama and French (2002) ). 16 Using the sample period to estimate target leverage is biased towards finding a result in favor of the tradeoff theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)), and using historical averages unrealistically assumes that leverage targets have not changed over time. If cross sectional regressions are used to estimate the target and they do not include every factor that predicts leverage, there will be a missing variable in those cross sections. Titman and Wessels (1988) note the limitations of cross sectional leverage regressions: "there may be no unique representation of the attributes we wish to measure" and since the representations chosen can be imperfect, they introduce, "an errors-in-variable problem". rating are significant. The size of Φ r is also important. The more significant the cost associated with the downgrade, the more likely the firm will attempt to reverse the downgrade.
If L S < L r* and the firm received a one rating upgrade, TTCR implies a firm will increase leverage to move back to L r* if ((B(L r* )-C(L r* )) -(B(L S )-C(L S ) + Φ r*+1 )>AC (with r * +1 defined as the rating level one category higher than r
The inequality implies a firm will increase leverage following a leverage reduction and upgrade if the tradeoff benefits outweigh the adjustment costs and discrete cost of a downgrade. In this case, the upgrade itself does not increase the likelihood of a reversal in leverage. Conditional on the same change in leverage, an upgrade makes it less likely that the firm will undertake capital structure behavior to reverse the change in leverage. The downgrade and upgrade results together imply capital structure behavior will be more significant following a downgrade than an upgrade, an additional implication distinct from TT.
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Case 2: Credit rating agencies initiate a policy change such that there are new levels of L r , which I denote as LL r. This could occur because rating agencies have become more or less stringent, or rating agencies could have changed their treatment of particular securities. Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998) and Doherty and Phillips (2002) study the change in rating standards of credit rating agencies over time. For the period 1978 -1995 , Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998 find that rating agencies consistently became more stringent, such that a firm with the same levels of accounting variables and equity risk measures had lower ratings over time. This is true at both investment grade and speculative grade levels. Doherty and Phillips (2002) draw similar conclusions, focusing on the insurance industry specifically.
TT implication: No implication, since nothing fundamental changed in the firm.
TTCR implication:
If the change in policy is more stringent such that LL r < L r ∀ r and if the firm's optimal leverage was L r* , the firm receives a downgrade and the firm's new optimal leverage could be at LL r* , the different leverage required to keep the same rating. Assuming a one rating downgrade, a firm will reduce leverage the next year to LL r* if (B(LL r* )-C(LL r* ) + Φ r* ) -(B(L r* )-C(L r* ))>AC. This implies a downgrade itself can imply a reduction in leverage the subsequent period, even if the firm's leverage or financial condition didn't change the previous period. 18 The size of Φ r is also significant. The greater the discrete cost of the downgrade, the more likely the firm will reduce leverage to attempt to reverse the downgrade.
If the change in policy is more lenient such that LL r > L r ∀ r, the firm is able to maintain the same rating with a higher level of leverage. If the firm also received an upgrade and if LL r* is less than that the firm will increase leverage, since the upgrade provides a discrete benefit to the firm.
18 It is also possible the policy change and downgrade would cause a firm to increase leverage. The firm might increase leverage if the leverage optimum for the firm is no longer at the same minimum rating level r, but instead changed to L T or LL r*-1 (with r * -1 defined as the rating level one category lower than r * ). A firm would increase leverage in this instance if (B(L T )-C(L T )) -(B(L r* )-C(L r* ))>AC or (B(LL r*-1 )-C(LL r*-1 )) -(B(L r* )-C(L r* ))>AC, respectively. These cases represent instances where the rating agency policy becomes so stringent it is no longer optimal for the firm to target that same minimum rating.
Conditional on the size of the tradeoff benefits from increasing leverage, a rating upgrade makes it less likely the firm undertakes capital structure behavior to move to the optimal. The larger Φ r*+1 is, the less likely the firm will increase leverage, conditional on the tradeoff benefits. 19 The TTCR implications of Case 2 in general are similar to Case 1 for capital structure behavior, with downgrades implying subsequent reductions in leverage and upgrades by themselves implying no capital structure behavior.
Case 3a: Permanent change to the firm that does not affect the probability of bankruptcy (e.g., changes in relative tax rates that do not affect after tax cash flows), such that the functional form of A firm might also reduce leverage from a more lenient policy with no upgrade since LL r*+1 could now maximize firm value. This could occur if the more lenient credit rating standards reduce the cost of departing from the tradeoff optimum enough for the firm to try to achieve the higher rating. The firm will reduce leverage if (B(LL r*+1 )-C(LL r*+1 )+ Φ r*+1 ) -(B(L r* )-C(L r* )) >AC. LL r* could also be greater than or equal to L T , in which case L T or LL r*+1 could maximize firm value, and LL r* would not maximize firm value. The firm would either increase leverage to L T or decrease leverage to LL r*+1, if the benefits of doing so outweighed the adjustment costs. Since no upgrades occur in any of these instances, no capital structure behavior is implied following rating changes.
(1990) and Graham (1996) ), and I include several measures from these papers in the empirical tests of this paper.
Since the levels of L r have not changed, the firm would not have received an upgrade or downgrade in this case. Therefore no specific capital structure activity is implied from this case following changes in credit ratings. Unlike TT however, in some cases TTCR will imply no capital structure activity even if AC=0 simply because firm value could still be maximized at L r* (even though L T has changed). Alternatively, the shift in the curve can also imply a different level of optimal leverage under TTCR, but not due to any change in rating. For these cases, the implications are similar in nature to TT. TT implication: The implications are identical to Case 3a.
TTCR implication: This case can be interpreted as a combination of cases 2 and 3a. As one example, consider a firm that has an increase in business risk or probability of distress such that CC(L)=zC(L) with z>1 and LL r < L r ∀ r. This implies that the firm will be downgraded at its current level of leverage, L r* , and will likely have a different optimal level of leverage. This new optimum could be at several different potential levels, including LL r* , LL r*-1 or L 21 If, due to the change in C(L), L * T is lower than L r* but greater than LL r* , the firm will achieve first positive and then negative tradeoff benefits if it moved to LL r* . In this case the firm will again reduce leverage to regain the higher rating if Φ r* >AC+((B(L r* )-zC(L r* )) -(B(LL r* )-zC(LL r* )), but the firm might be more likely to reduce leverage than in the previous case given that the tradeoff effects are indeterminate. 22 For example, if the firm reduced its business risk such that CC(L)=zC(L) with z<1 and LL r > L r ∀ r, the firm could attain the same rating with a higher level of leverage. Tradeoff effects will imply a higher leverage under TT or TTCR. If the firm also received an upgrade and LL r* is less than L * T , the firm will increase leverage to LL r* if (B(LL r* )-zC(LL r* )) -(B(L r* )-zC(Lr*)) >AC+ Φ r*+1 . The left hand side is positive since B'(L r* )-C'(L r* )>0, implying tradeoff benefits of increasing leverage. The upgrade itself decreases the likelihood of an increase in leverage.
Table I Credit Rating Upgrades and Downgrades by Rating Level
Number of firm years in the sample in which the firm was downgraded or upgraded to the indicated rating level. Percentages are shown for the number of downgrades to a rating as a percentage of the number of firm years with that rating. The sample is all Compustat firms from 1987 to 2003 with a credit rating for 3 consecutive years and 3 years of non-missing variables required for conducting the tests of the paper. The credit rating is a firm's long-term domestic issuer credit rating.
Table II Debt and Equity Decisions Following Rating Changes
Percentage of firm years in which the firm undertakes the indicated capital market activity, given the change in rating the previous year. Issuance and reduction is defined as a net issuance or reduction greater than 5% of beginning of year assets. The indicated change in rating is as of the year prior to the capital structure decision. "Downgrade to Speculative" indicates a downgrade from an investment grade rating at time t-2 to a speculative grade rating at time t-1, and "Upgrade to Investment Grade" indicates the opposite. The sample is all Compustat firms from 1987 to 2003 with a credit rating for 3 consecutive years and 3 years of non-missing variables required for conducting the tests of the paper. Coefficients, in percentages, on Downgrade, a dummy variable indicating the firm was downgraded the previous period, in regressions of net debt minus net equity divided by book or market assets on Downgrade and various control variables. ***, **, and * below the coefficient denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Bold columns in Panel A are where at least 2 out of 4 coefficients for that rating are significant at 5%. Rows (1) and (2) are tests using book measures of leverage and (3) and (4) -2.2 -3.0** -2.4 -2.9 -5.9** -16.9*** -7.8*** -11.4** (2) Downgrade1 -2.0** -1.2 -2.5** -1.2 -0.6 -2.5 -8.5* -1.7 -0.6 Downgrade2+ -1.9 -2.5 -3.3** -2.9 -3.3* -5.7** -16.3*** -5.0 -12.3** (3) Downgrade1 -1.2* -1.3** -2.1*** -1.7* -1.3 -3.2** -6.4 -6.9 1.8 Downgrade2+ -1.1 -2.3* -2.3** -2.5* -3.3** -5.2*** -16.7*** -7.3** -11.4** (4) Downgrade1 -1.3** -1.4** -2.2*** -1.9* -1.6 -3.3** -5.6 -6.3 -0.9 Downgrade2+ -1.3 -2.2* -2.5** -2.8* -3.8** -5.4*** -14.3*** -6.9** -9.6** Coefficients and standard errors from cross-sectional regressions by year of net debt raised for the year minus net equity raised for the year divided by beginning of year total market assets on a constant, a dummy variable for if a firm was downgraded the period before, the firms change in market leverage the previous period, and control variables measured at the beginning of each year. The control variables (not shown) are the firms credit rating level, z-score and levels and changes in EBITDA/A, EBITDA divided by total assets, and ln(Sales), the natural log of total sales, and the market to book ratio. 
Rating
-2.6% +6.9% Upgraded previous year No change in rating
